
Éva Kovács

This much needed introductory book is a remarkably complete survey of cognitive linguistics, presenting the theoretical foundations and the major new developments in this fast-growing field of linguistics. In twelve chapters it highlights the basic principles of the cognitive linguistic approach to the analysis of linguistic meaning and grammatical form, and some of its most important results and implications for the study of language. It is intended to be used as a textbook for a course on cognitive linguistics, but it is also recommended as essential reading for linguists doing research in this field.

The book’s 12 chapters are each divided into three parts being organized as follows: Part I focuses on the conceptual approach to linguistic analysis, Part II is concerned with ‘the cognitive approaches to lexical semantics’ and Part III deals with ‘the cognitive approaches to grammatical form’.

In contrast to the dominant approaches to semantics and syntax in generative grammar and in truth-conditional semantics, some of the basic assumptions of cognitive linguistics are that “language is not an autonomous cognitive faculty, grammar is conceptualization, and knowledge of language emerges from language use”, which are presented in the introduction (1).

This is followed by Part I, which presents the basic principles and key concepts underlying cognitive linguistics, such as frames, domains and spaces (Ch. 2); conceptualization and construal operations (Ch. 3); categories, concepts and meanings (Ch. 4). These principles and concepts are refined, expanded and further illustrated through their application to aspects of word meaning and to grammar in Part II and III, respectively.

The heart of the book is Part II, which includes topics widely discussed in cognitive linguistics, such as polysemy (Ch. 5) and metaphor (Ch. 8), and lexical semantic topics that have generally not been examined by cognitive linguists, i.e. lexical relations, such as hyponymy and meronymy (Ch. 6) and antonymy and complementarity (Ch. 7). The authors demonstrate that these sense relations are worthwhile object of study (even for cognitive linguistics) and that the “dynamic construal approach” can throw new light on their nature. In other words, sense
relations are treated as semantic relations not between words as such, but between “particular contextual construals of words”.

As an illustration for sense relations, let us take meronymy, which is defined as follows:

If A is a meronym of B in a particular context, then any member a of the extension of A maps onto a specific member b of the extension of B which it is construed as a part or it potentially stands in an intrinsically construed relation of part to some actual or potential member of B. (159)

To justify the above definition, consider the following examples: finger and hand, park and lake. According to the definition, finger is a meronym of hand because for every entity properly describable as a finger, there corresponds some entity properly describable as a hand, of which it is construed as a part. The authors argue that the relation of meronymy concerns only “intrinsic construals of partness”. It is true that in the case of finger, ‘partness of hand’ is an essential component of the original construal, i.e. it is intrinsic. In contrast, lake would not qualify as a meronym of park as the ‘partness’ is imposed on the construal as it were from the outside. (159-160)

Polysemy is treated here as “a matter of isolating different parts of the total meaning potential of a word in different circumstances”. The process of isolating a portion of meaning potential is viewed as “the creation of a sense boundary delimitating an autonomous unit of sense”. For example, in John moored the boat to the bank the fact that bank can also refer to a financial institution is suppressed.

As for metaphors, the authors also make an important point: if one wants to get to the heart of metaphor as an interpretive mechanism, one must look at “freshly coined, novel metaphors”. It is because the fully established and conventionalized ones examined by the Lakoffians have “irrecoverably lost at least some of their original properties”. For example, in They had to prune the workforce the use of prune still strongly evokes the source domain of agriculture, together with the meaning of removing unnecessary growth and increase vigour. This is therefore still in its youth as a metaphor. In contrast, in There is a flourishing black market in software there, in the authors’ words, flourish came into English ca. 1300 with both literal and metaphorical meanings, but most people probably think of its literal meaning as having to do with businesses or may even feel a flourishing garden to be an extension from this. (205-206)

At the beginning of Part III, it is pointed out that the cognitive approach to syntax goes under the name of construction grammar, which “grew out of a concern to find a place for idiomatic expressions in the speaker’s knowledge of a grammar of their language”. (225). The first chapter, Chapter 9 presents the
argument for representing grammatical knowledge as constructions, and Chapter 16 ('An overview of construction grammars') outlines the essential features of a construction grammar examining the structure of constructions and their organization in the grammatical knowledge of a speaker. This truly interesting chapter also surveys four variants of construction grammar found in cognitive linguistics, namely Construction Grammar (Kay and Fillmore 1999), the construction grammar of Lakoff (1987) and Goldberg (1995), Cognitive Grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991) and Radical Construction Grammar (Croft 2001) focusing on the distinctive characteristics of each theory.

Chapter 11 of this part describes the usage-based model for language use, developed in greatest detail for morphology and syntax. Comparing the usage based model with the traditional structuralist and generative models of grammatical representation, Croft and Cruse argue that in the structuralist and generative models, only the structure of the grammatical forms determine their representations in a speaker’s mind, whereas in the usage-based model, “properties of the use of utterances in communication” also play a distinct role. (292)

As far as the morphological representations of words concerned, a number of concrete hypotheses and supporting evidence are put forward in the first section of this chapter, including the role of token frequency in entrenchment, the role of type frequency in productivity, the formation of schemas, phonological and semantic similarity in connections between words, and the emergence of generalizations in language acquisition.

In the next section of chapter 11, it is examined how much of these hypotheses might hold for syntax. The frequency effects in syntax are illustrated among others by English auxiliary verbs, which have a very high token frequency in questions and negative sentences, compared to other verbs. As highly entrenched constructions they are irregular in that they undergo changes such as reduction. In addition to syntactic irregularity as a consequence of high type frequency, the major, most schematic constructions of a language have maximal syntactic productivity, such as the transitive constructions [SVO]. The final point made here is that syntax is also acquired in a “gradual, piecemeal, inductive fashion”. (227)

In conclusion, this excellent book discusses a wide range of interesting questions in cognitive linguistics, and will be of interest to anyone investigating cognitive semantics and construction grammar. It also has the rare virtue of beings fairly well organized, rich in examples and having clear explanations. One weakness of the book may be that the chapters often lack a detailed summary, which would be very useful for a course book.

All in all, we can say that the authors have succeeded in their aim of showing that the cognitive approach to language not only opens up new aspects of language, but also addresses the traditional concerns of grammarians and semanticists.